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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Residence Requirements for Divorce
Changing residence is now a routine practice in the United States.
Statistics reveal that almost one in every five Americans changes his
or her home each year.' Divorce has similarly become a common
phenomenon. Estimates based on 1972 statistics reveal that the divorce
rate for that year was four per thousand persons.2 This combination
of mobility and high divorce rates prompts a new look at state statutes
that require definite periods of in-state residence before a person can
petition for divorce.3
The need for re-examination of divorce residence requirements is
intensified by recent Supreme Court cases that have challenged the con-
stitutionality of other residence requirements. For example, in Shapiro
v. Thompson4 the Court declared that several statutes requiring resi-
dence of one year before a citizen could receive state welfare aid were
unconstitutional because they infringed on the right to travel. While
the Court had previously held unconstitutional state laws or actions
that directly interfered with travel between states,5 Shapiro was the first
Supreme Court decision to declare a state statute unconstitutional be-
cause it constituted a denial of the right to travel even though the stat-
ute did not directly restrict travel as such. Not only was this feature
of Shapiro unique, but in holding that the right to travel was a funda-
mental right, Shapiro was also the first Supreme Court decision to as-
sert that a classification scheme based on old and new residents should
be examined by the strict equal protection test.0 This test requires
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
table no. 41 at 34 (92d ed. 1971).
2. THE WORLD ALAMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcTS (1974). These figures indicate
an 82% increase in rate since 1962.
3. Forty-nine states have residence requirements, ranging from 60 days to 2 years,
that must be met before a party can file for divorce. California has no requirement
for filing but requires 6 months residence before granting a divorce. See AM. Jun. 2D
DESK BooK, Doc. No. 125 (Supp. 1973).
4. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
5. E.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
6. 394 U.S. at 634. See Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and The
Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 989 (1969).
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that a compelling state interest is needed to justify the statutory clas-
sification. 7
Whfile Shapiro gave the right to travel new constitutional impor-
tance by requiring a compelling state interest to justify its restriction,
the Court explicitly made no attempt to extend the holding beyond the
specific facts of the case.8 This fact, combined with the Court's em-
phasis that the statutory denial of benefits in Shapiro was .purposely
designed to deter movement of indigents into the state,0 led some courts
and commentators to believe that the Court had condemned only those
requirements that acutally had deterred travel and, further, that "de-
terrence" was limited to situations where residence requirements denied
essentials of life to recent immigrants into the state.10
Dunn v. Blumstein" involved a state statute that required one
year's residence before voting. In this case the Court concluded that
either the denial of the right to vote to some citizens or the fact that
the denial was based on recent interstate travel would require the state
to show "substantial" and "compelling" reasons for having imposed
residency requirements. 2 Furthermore, even a substantial state interest
would not justify the requirement "if there are other, reasonable ways
to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected
activit[ies] .... ,,13
The Court concluded that the voting statute in Blumstein did not
pass the above mentioned tests. However, it did not limit its holding
to this particular statute but instead discussed residency requirements
in general in an attempt to clarify some of the confusion that had ac-
companied its holding in Shapiro:
It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of wel-
fare is the more potent deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest
upon a finding that a denial of welfare actually deterred travel
7. The strict equal protection or compelling state interest test must be met when
a suspect category (e.g., race, alienage) or a fundamental right (e.g., voting) is involved
in a statutory classification. The traditional equal protection test is used in testing other
classifications. Under the traditional test, the state's reasons for the classification need
not be "compelling" but only "rational." See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
8. 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
9. Id. at 629.
10. See Note, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rav., supra note 6. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 P.2d
939 (Hawaii 1972), which dealt with residence requirements for divorce, relied on this
interpretation of Shapiro. Id. at 944-45.
11. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
12. Id. at 335.
13. Id. at 343.
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.* .. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling-state-
interest test would be triggered by -"'any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] ... .
While this language in Blumstein attempted to define the scope of
deterrence, it did not solve the basic problem. Rather, the Court's
opinion merely served to shift questions concerning what constituted
"deterrents" to travel to what constituted "penalties" on travel. Later
in the opinion, the Court stated that "durational residence laws must
be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional
unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are 'necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest."'15 However, many lower
courts and commentators are still unwilling to read Blumstein as cate-
gorically requiring that all residence laws classifying persons solely on
the basis of travel should be judged by a strict compelling state interest
test.
Recent cases dealing with durational residency requirements for
divorce are examples of this confusion. In Larsen v. Gallogly'16 plain-
tiff, who was deified a hearing for divorce because he failed to qualify
as a resident, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a
Rhode Island statute that required one party to reside in the state for
two years before Rhode Island courts would hear a petition for di-
vorce.' 7  Larsen contended, among other things, that the residence re-
quirement unconstitutionally penalized his right of interstate travel. 8
While accepting the Blumstein statement that all residence stat-
utes must be measured by a strict standard, the district court questioned
whether the law "penalized" the exercise of the right to travel:
A "penalty" in this context means the suffering of "disadvan-
tage, loss or hardship due to some action." As a result of the resi-
dency requirement for divorce, new citizens of Rhode Island must
endure a hiatus of two years before they become entitled to a ju-
dicial adjustment of a "fundamental human relationship." Without
doubt this statute "penaliz[es] persons because they have recently
migrated. . . ." Therefore, we find that the defendants must
demonstrate a compelling state interest in order for us to sustain
the statute as constitutional.' 9
14. Id. at 339-340, quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
15. Id. at 342, quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
16. 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.T. 1973).
17. R.L GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-12 (1969).
18. The court held the law unconstitutional on both equal protection and due proc-
ess grounds but directed most of its discussion to the equal protection aspects of the
case.
19. 361 F. Supp. at 307 (citations omitted).
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In advancing justifications to support the classification, the state
had argued primarily that the requirement was necessary to ensure that
one of the parties was a bona fide domiciliary of the state.2 ° Since
domicle21 in the forum state is necessary before a state can grant a di-
vorce that will be recognized in other states, 22 the court conceded that
the assurance of domicile was unquestionably an important state inter-
est and that the two-year requirement furthered this interest since it
was an objective and efficient standard by which to judge claims of
domiciliary intent. However, the court felt that the state's argument
failed since "administrative convenience cannot serve as justification
for the abridgement of constitutional guarantees where less restrictive
means are available. 23  The other justifications made to support the
two-year requirement were summarily rejected by the court because
they were unrelated to the two-year requirement.2 4
In Davis v. Davis2" the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a one-
year residency requirement for divorce 26 against a challenge similar to
the one in Larsen. While the Davis court considered the possibility
20. Id. at 309.
21. Domicile indicates present habitation plus present intention to remain. Resi-
dence is merely the current living place. See BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 572, 1473
(4th rev. ed. 1968).
22. In Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) the Supreme Court ruled
that each state must give full faith and credit to divorce decrees obtained in other states
if one of the divorced parties was a bona fide domiciliary of the state granting the de-
cree. In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), however, the Court qualified
its earlier decision, holding that, if asked to recognize a divorce decree from another
forum, a state court may re-examine the evidence originally given on domicile and make
an independent finding whether one of the parties was indeed domiciled in the divorcing
state. According to Williams II, if the re-examining state finds the evidence insufficient,
it does not have to recognize the divorce.
Requiring extended residence or other indicia of domicile, however, will not always
ensure that bona fide domicile will be found by the inquiring state. See cases collected
in Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1303, 1313-15 (1953); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1385, 1393-94
(1948).
23. 361 F. Supp. at 309. The court went on to point out other ways in which
domicile might be assured. It suggested that inquiry into domicile might be made part
of the divorce proceeding. Alternatively, existing perjury sanctions might be used or
a statute passed punishing abuse of process. Id.
The suggestion that a shorter period of residency might be constitutional has been
tried in Wisconsin. After the two-year residence requirement for divorce was held uncon-
stitutional in Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971), the state
legislature amended the statute to require only a six-month period of residence.
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.05(3) (Spec. Pamphlet 1973), formerly, ch. 90, § 5
[1959] Wis. Sess. Laws.
24. These arguments were that the law served to promote marital stability, to pre-
vent use of courts by outsiders, and to prevent the state from becoming a divorce mill.
361 F. Supp. at 310.
25. 297 Minn. -, 210 N.W.2d 221 (1973).
26. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07 (1969).
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that Blumstein could be read as requiring the strict equal protection
test every time the right to travel was restricted by a residence statute,27
the court rejected this interpretation and chose to interpret Blumstein
in the light of a more recent Supreme Court case, VIandis v. Kline.28
Although Kline itself -held a residence requirement29 unconstitutional
on due process grounds, it approved the earlier case of Starns v. Mal-
kerson,30 which upheld against the traditional equal protection stand-
ard a statute requiring a one year period of residence in the state be-
fore a student could get in-state tuition privileges.3 1 Using Starns
as a guide, the Minnesota court held that
since a durational-residency requirement for resident tuition can be
said to constitute a penalty on interstate travel, and since it is dif-
ficult to find any compelling state interest in requiring a 1-year wait
for resident tuition, it seems clear that the court is implying that
not every penalty on interstate travel triggers the compelling-state-
interest test. In other words, it appears that we may weigh the
harshness of the penalty in determining whether there has been a
denial of equal protection. 32
The court then concluded that the penalty inherent in the residence
statute in Blumstein was a harsh one, involving "a fundamental politi-
cal right, .. . preservative of all rights,' "" but that the "penalty"
involved in the divorce cases caused little hardship because divorce was
neither a basic right nor an urgent need. 4 The court did not feel the
need to apply the compelling interest test to the statute. Instead, re-
lying on the traditional equal protection test, the court upheld the re-
quirement as rationally related to ensuring the state's interest in having
only bona fide domiciliaries before its courts as divorce applicants.3 5
Yet another view of the status of residence requirements for di-
vorce was taken in Coleman v. Coleman,36 which decided a challenge
27. 297 Minn. at-, 210 N.W.2d at 224.
28. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
29. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b (Supp. 1973). This statute established an
irrebutable presumption of non-residency for tuition purposes during a student's entire
university career. In the case of a single student, the presumption attached if his or
her legal address had been outside of Connecticut anytime in the year before application
to the university. If the student were married, he or she was considered a non-resident
if his or her address was out of state at the time of application.
30. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
31. 412 U.S. at 452-53 &n.9.
32. 297 Minn. at -, 210 N.W.2d at 225 (emphasis added).
33. Id., quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
34. 297 Minn. at -, 210 N.W.2d at 226.
35. Id. at-, 210 N.W.2d at 226-27.
36. 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972).
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to the one-year residence requirement of an Ohio statute.3 7  The Cole-
man court at first approached the issue in the same manner as the
Davis court, questioning whether a residence law postponing divorce
was a "penalty" on travel. However, even after deciding that it was
not a "penalty, '3 8 the Ohio court did not apply the traditional equal
protection test to the law as the Davis court did but proceeded to ques-
tion whether the residency requirement met the strict test of fulfilling
a compelling state interest. 9 As in Larsen and Davis, the major in-
terest asserted by the state was the need for the year's residence to as-
sure domicile and jurisdiction. While this same argument failed the
strict test in Larsen because the court felt there were less restrictive
means of finding domicile, the Coleman court held,
In view of the numerous possible combinations of objective
expressions, and the fact that those who do lead a transitory life
might never accumulate that assortment of objective manifestations
that would convince an individual judge to exercise jurisdiction, we
conclude that the state has used the least restrictive manner of in-
suring that its divorce laws are not utilized by nonresidents of Ohio
40
The court held further that the other state justification for the require-
ment, the need for a time period for newcomers to re-examine their
marriage in light of the move, was "reasonable" and therefore accept-
able.41 This result seems to call into- question whether the court had
really committed itself to applying the compelling state interest test.
While it is true that Blumstein does not label specific time periods
constitutional or unconstitutional,42 it is also true that merely because
a restriction is found reasonable does not mean that the compelling
state interest test is met if a lesser restriction will serve the same pur-
pose.43 In Coleman the court did not consider whether a shorter pe-
riod would serve the same purpose.44
In apparently deviating from the strict equal protection test, Cole-
man may be implicitly applying a theory announced explicitly in Shiff-
37. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.03 (Page 1971).
38. 32 Ohio St. 2d at 159, 291 N.E.2d at 534.
39. Id. at 162-63, 291 N.E.2d at 536.
40. Id. at 162, 291 N.E.2d at 535. The court went on to note that there were
no effective checks to false testimony regarding intent to remain in the state in divorce
litigation. Id. at 162 n.10, 291 N.W.2d 535 n.10. Compare this statement with the
solutions presented in Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D.R.L 1973).
41. 32 Ohio St. 2d at 161, 291 N.E.2d at 535.
42. 405 U.S. at 348.
43. Id. at 343.
44. 32 Ohio St. 2d at 161 n.9, 291 N.E.2d at 535 n.9.
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man v. Askew.45 The Shiffman court reasoned that although Blum-
stein required a "compelling" state interest to uphold residency require-
ments, each travel restriction must be weighed against the right it pen-
alizes.46 As a result of this balancing process, the more essential the
right affected and the greater the restriction on travel, the more com-
pelling the state interest needed to allow restriction. If, as both the
Coleman and Shiffman courts agree, divorce rights are less fundamental
than voting rights, the test, although still termed a "compelling state
interest test" will be less stringent than that applied in voting cases.
In analyzing the divergent approaches taken by the courts one can
make an independent questioning of the Supreme Court's intention in
Blumstein. The interpretation that all residency requirements must be
measured by the compelling state interest test is supported by the
Court's seemingly categorical language. 7 In addition, the Court did
not have to emphasize the right to travel since the same decision could
have been made on grounds that the classification of -residents abridged
the fundamental right to vote. This alone would have triggered the
compelling state interest test.48  By stressing the travel issue as it did,
the Court might have been indicating that all residency cases should
be examined strictly.40
Further, as the Court mentions explicitly in the older direct-in-
fringement-on-travel cases the issue was whether there would be any
basis for preventing interference on a large scale if a state were al-
lowed to hinder travel in a minor way. 50' Such reasoning can be ap-
plied to indirect infringements and used -to support the theory that all
residence requirements should be required to meet a compelling in-
terest test.
Nevertheless, unless the right qualified by the residency require-
ment is taken into consideration, a court will have neither a method
to judge whether the right to travel has been infringed nor a way of
determining how strong a state interest must be in order to support the
requirement. The decision whether a state interest is compelling or
45. 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973). In this case a three judge federal court
upheld a Florida law (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.021 (Supp. 1973)) that required six months
residence before filing for divorce.
46. 359 F. Supp. at 1233.
47. See 405 U.S. at 342.
48. Id. at 335.
49. See Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Penalty on the Right to
Travel-Durational Residence Requirements, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 914, 925.
50, 405 U.S. at 340 n.9. ... . ..
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not can hardly be made in a "vacuum."5 1
In affirming Starns v. Malkerson,52 the Court approved a district
court decision holding that while certain state justifications might not
satisfy the court in some residence requirement cases, the same reasons
might be acceptable in other instances where the requirements did not
create serious hardship.53 The decision in Starns, although made be-
fore Blumstein, apparently retains its validity54 and supports the view
that the penalty imposed by the requirement is important in deter-
mining by what standard the travel restriction is to be measured.
The interpretation of Blumstein, however, is only one aspect of
the divorce cases. In each of the cases that rejected the equal pro-
tection challenge, the court summarily dismissed the contention that
the- final resolution of marital relations is a fundamental right equal
in importance to voting or welfare assistance. 5 Even Larsen, which
upheld the challenge, made only passing reference to an "adjustment
of a 'fundamental relationship.' "56 The failure to explore prior judi-
cial determinations of the fundamentality of marriage relations may
well be an important oversight. If the rights involved in marriage
relationships are constitutionally fundamental, their restriction alone
would activate the strict equal protection test" and forestall the ne-
cessity of having to interpret Blumstein. Even if these rights are not
ultimately given constitutional sanction, their importance cannot be de-
nied.
Several older landmark cases dealing with marriage and related
issues can be cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court has
found marriage rights to be fundamental., More recently, in Boddie
51. 359 F. Supp. at 1233.
52. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
53. Id. at 237-38.
54. The one-year requirement upheld in Starns was apparently approved in Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 n.9 (1973). However, in a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, seriously questioned this approval in
the light of Blumstein. Id. at 455.
55. Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Davis v. Davis,
297 Minn. -, 210 N.W.2d 221, 226 (1973); Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 155,
158-59, 291 N.E.2d 530, 533 (1972).
56. 361 F. Supp. at 307.
57. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HA.v. L. REV. 1065,
1127-32 (1969).
58. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In this case, the Supreme Court
held a Virginia anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional on due process and equal protec-
tion grounds. The Court categorized marriage as "one of the 'basic civil rights of man"'
and held that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 12. See
allo Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941). In Skinner the Supreme Court held
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v. Connecticut,0 9 dealing with the access to divorce court, the Court
stressed the importance of marriage in our society as one of the bases
for its holding that due process was violated when a party was denied
a divorce because he lacked funds to pay a filing fee to initiate court
proceedings. 60
This view was further explained in United States v. Kra 61 and
Ortwein v. Schwab.6 2  In both Kras and Ortwein the initial plaintiffs
sought to rely on Boddie as precedent to find unconstitutional their
denial of judicial hearings in bankruptcy and welfare proceedings due
to their inability to pay filing fees. In Kras -the Court upheld the fil-
ing fee and distinguished Boddie:
We are also of the opinion that the filing fee requirement does not
deny Kras the equal protection of the laws. Bankruptcy is hardly
akin to free speech or marriage or to those rights, so many of which
are embedded in the First Amendment, that the court has come
to regard as fundamental and that demand the lofty requirement
of a compelling governmental interest before they may be signifi-
cantly regulated.63
In Ortwein the Court reinforced this statement, "In this case appellants
seek increased welfare payments. This interest, like that of Kras, has
far less constitutional significance than the interest of the Boddie ap-
pellants."' 4  This approach is significant also since it gives marriage
relations a higher constitutional status than the need for welfare pay-
ments. In the divorce cases the lower courts consistently treated wel-
fare as having a higher status than divorce. 65
Whether :the statements of the earlier cases of Boddie, Kras, or
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that subjected habitual criminals to sterilization
on the basis of types of crimes committed. The Court required the law to be strictly
scrutinized since "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." Id. at 541.
While it might be contended that the statements of Loving and Skinner might not
be applicable to divorce cases, it must be stressed that residence requirements that re-
strict divorce interfere not only with the rights in the existing marriage but also the
rights of future marriage.
59. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
60. Id. at 376.
61. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
62. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
63. 409 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added). Significantly at this point the Court refers
to Shapiro and its holding that the right to travel is fundamental, 394 U.S. at 638, per-
haps impliedly comparing marriage and travel rights.
64. 410 U.S. at 659.
65. While the question of the constitutional ftndamentality of marriage rights is
still unanswered, it has been decided that there is no constitutional right to welfare as-
sistance. Hence, the compelling interest test is not automatically applied in welfare
cases. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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Ortwein can be relied on to support a holding that divorce rights are
constitutionally fundamental is still uncertain. The recent Supreme
Court decision in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez"6 indicates
that the vital interest of our society in the exercise of any right does
not give immediate constitutional protection to it.67  Instead the Court
in Rodriguez reasons that to gain constitutional protection the right
must be "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.""3
Only the dicta in Kras has thus far implied a direct constitutional guar-
antee of the right of marriage dissolution. 69
Although the Rodriguez reasoning indicates that there may be no
absolute certainty regarding the constitutional protection of the rights
involved with marriage, the lower courts have been remiss in not pur-
suing the question. The lack of citation in the recent divorce cases to
any of the older cases dealing with marriage rights70 and the failure to
consider Boddie for the proposition that marriage is an essential right71
indicate that these courts neglected to anlayze the Supreme Court's
views on marriage before coming to their independent decisions.
The analysis of Blumstein undertaken by -the lower courts in the
divorce cases is valuable and necessary in exploring the ramifications
of the right to travel. However, as more people divorce 2 and bring
about judicial involvement in the dissolution of their marriages, there
is a definite need for the courts to deal directly with the constitutional
status of marriage related rights.
SANDRA R. JOHNSON
66. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Rodriguez dealt with a challenge to the Texas scheme
of collecting and allocating money for public school use. The challenge claimed the
scheme made a classification that hindered some in their pursuit of the fundamental
right of education.
67. Id. at 29-34.
68. Id. at 33-34.
69. See text accompanying note 63 supra. Mr. Justice Marshall, in his dissent,
objected to the majority's "suggestion" that divorce might be fundamental and questioned
whether the Court really meant to go this far. 409 U.S. at 462 n.4.
70. The dates of decision of the cases may explain why some courts did not cite
Kras and Ortwein. The latter was decided on Mar. 5, 1973; the former on Jan. 10,
1973. Larsen v. Gallogly was decided on July 16, 1973; Shiffman v. Askew on June 1,
1973; Davis v. Davis on Aug. 24, 1973 and Coleman v. Coleman on Dec. 15, 1972.
71. Larsen, which held the residence requirement unconstitutional, did cite Boddie
as authority, but did not deal with it in detail in relation to the issue of marriage rights
alone. 361 F. Supp. at 307-08. Coleman also cites Boddie but does not treat it as
applicable in the case before it. 32 Ohio St. at 160 n.7, 291 N.E.2d at 534 n.7. Davis
speaks of Boddie only in connection with the due process argument. 297 Minn. at -,
210 N.W.2d at 227. Shiffman refers to Boddie only as authority for leaving divorce
regulation to the states. 359 F. Supp. at 1229.
72. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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Federal Jurisdiction-Municipal Immunity Under the
Civil Rights Act-Closing the Loopholes
In Monroe v. Pape1 the United States Supreme Court held that
42 U.S.C. section 19832 does not contemplate municipal liability for
the unconstitutional acts of municipal employees. Since that de-
cision, however, the lower federal courts and several commentators
have developed a number of ways to distinguish Monroe and thus hold
municipalities vicariously liable. The Court, in two recent cases, closed
some of these "loopholes" in Monroe by reaffirming the controversial
interpretation of section 1983 that a municipality is not a "person"
within the meaning of that section. In Moor v. County of Alameda4
the Court refused to allow incorporation of municipal liability under
the California Tort Claims Act into a section 1983 claim and similarly
upheld the district court's refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
the state claim against the municipal defendant. In City of Kenosha
v. Bruno the Court held that equitable relief was unavailable against
a municipal corporation for violations of section 1983.
Moor involved injuries to appellants during a civil disturbance in
Berkeley, California. The injuries allegedly resulted from the wrong-
ful discharge of a shotgun by a deputy sheriff who was attempting to
quell the disturbance. Appellants brought suit in federal district court,
alleging a conspiracy to deprive them of their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech and assembly and due process. The federal claims
arose under section 1983, and jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C.
section 1343.0 Joined as defendants were the sheriff and several
deputies individually and the County of Alameda as their employer.
The latter was alleged to be amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. section
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
4. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
5. 412U.S. 507 (1973).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). This is the general jurisdictional statute, giving
original jurisdiction to the federal district courts over civil rights claims.
19741 1289
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19887 which, the plaintiff contended, incorporated municipal liability
under the California Tort Claims Acts into section 1983. Both appel-
lants urged the district court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
state law claims against the county.' The district court dismissed all
claims against the county, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.'0
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983
claim on the authority of Monroe v. Pape." The Court, in refusing to
accept appellants' argument that section 1988 incorporated municipal
liability into a federal section 1983 cause of action, pointed out that
section 1988 "is intended to complement the various acts which do
create federal causes of action for the violations of federal civil rights."' 2
The provisions of section 1988 authorizing use of state law are meant
to furnish suitable remedial measures when the federal substantive pro-
visions provide insufficient or unsuitable remedies. 8 The cause of ac-
tion must arise under the federal civil rights act' 4 initially in order for
section 1988 to be operative. An entire state cause of action cannot
be "federalized" through section 1988.15
Furthermore, the Court stated that section 1988 provides for the
use of state law by federal courts only when "not inconsistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States."'(' Since the Monroe
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause, and if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction
of punishment on the party found guilty.
8. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
9. Rundle v. Madigan, 331 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
10. Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), noted in 4 U. TOLEDO L.
Rav. 201 (1973). The court of appeals also dismissed Moor's diversity jurisdiction ar-
gument, holding that the county was not a citizen for diversity purposes.
11. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
12. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 (1973). The Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit on the diversity issue, holding that the county was a citizen of Cali-
fornia because, under state law it was a "body corporate and politic" and not the merd
arm or alter ego of the State. Id. at 717-22.
13. Id. at 702-03.
14. For purposes of this Note, the Civil Rights Act refers to those acts which are
now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-89 (1970).
15. 411 U.S. at 703-04.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
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decision was part of the laws of the United States, the imposition of
vicarious municipal liability would be inconsistent with the Monroe
interpretation of section 1983.11 The Court rejected the argument that
Monroe was distinguishable because the municipality involved in that
case had not been deprived of common-law sovereign immunity,
whereas in the present case California counties were no longer immune
under state law. Since Congress had rejected a municipal liability pro-
posal in passing the Civil Rights Act, it was difficult to infer an intent
to include liability for those municipalities not clothed with immunity
under state law.' The Court, therefore, held that the existence of
municipal liability under state law was irrelevant to liability under sec-
tion 1983.
The Court also affirmed the refusal by the district court to exer-
cise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim against the County.19
The question whether the district court had the power to exercise such
jurisdiction over a party not subject to independent federal jurisdiction
was left open by the Court. However, under the doctrine of United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs20 the district court had the discretion to decline
pendent jurisdiction. Since the claim against the county involved de-
fenses not available to the individual defendants and complicated is-
sues of state law, the Supreme Court held that the lower court's dis-
missal of the pendent state claims did not constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion. The Gibbs decision specifically recognized the possibilities of
jury confusion and the complexity of the state law as factors to be con-
sidered in exercising discretion.2
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno2 -the Court held that a municipal
corporation was not liable for the conduct of its employees for purposes
of equitable relief under section 1983. Appellants were owners of re-
tail liquor establishments that featured nude dancers. The city coun-
cils of Racine and Kenosha, Wisconsin denied renewal of their liquor
licenses after holding legislative hearings provided for by state statute.
Alleging deprivation of procedural due process, appellants brought
suits for declaratory and injunctive relief against the cities under sec-
tion 1983. The district court declared the state statute unconstitutional
and granted the injunctions. 23  On direct appeal the Supreme Court
17. 411 U.S. at 706.
18. Id. at 706-10.
19. Id. at 710-17.
20. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
21. Id. at 727.
22. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
23. Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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reversed because of lack of jurisdiction over the municipalities under
Monroe v. Pape.24 The Court reasoned that there was no evidence in
the legislative history of section 1983 that Congress meant to provide
a bifurcated approach to municipal liability, making municipalities
"persons" for purposes of equitable relief while excluding them from
liability for damages.2 5
MONROE v. PAPE
Monroe involved a section 1983 action for damages against the
City of Chicago for alleged brutality at the hands of Chicago police of-
ficers. The Court, after an extensive discussion of the legislative his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,26 concluded that legislative re-
action had been so "antagonistic" to the concept of municipal liability
for civil rights violations that Congress could not have meant to in-
clude municipalities within the word "person" as used in section 1983.
This conclusion was based upon the rejection of a proposed amend-
ment to the Act during congressional debates.17
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Monroe, noted
that a few months prior to legislative consideration of the Civil Rights
Act, Congress had passed an act that had provided rules of construc-
tion for acts of Congress.28 One provision of this Act declared that
"the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate."29 He found this provision to be "an allowable, not a man-
datory, one." Since the Court interpreted the legislative history as con-
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
25. 412 U.S. at 513.
26. 365 U.S. at 187-91. Monroe has been severely criticized for its interpretation
of congressional intent on the municipal liability issue. See the convincing treatment
of the legislative history in Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 132-36 (1972). See generally
Kates, Suing Municipalities and Other Public Entities Under the Civil Rights Act, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE Rv. 177 (1970); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. RE-V. 277 (1965); Note, Federal lurisdiction-Govern-
mental Immunity and Pendent Jurisdiction, 4 U. TOLEDO L. Rnv. 201 (1973).
27. Senator Sherman of Ohio proposed the amendment to provide for municipal
liability for any civil rights violation occurring within the boundaries of the municipality
whether committed by public officials or private citizens. The Senate passed the bill,
but it was rejected by the House. The conference committee failed to agree on the
amendment, and it was finally deleted in order to save the act and get it through the
House.
The House also raised questions about whether the imposition of liability by Con-
gress on the subdivisions of the states would be constitutional. The Court, however,
did not reach these constitutional issues. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
28. Id.
29. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
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elusively precluding municipal liability,3" the policy considerations fav-
oring municipal liability were not reached.
Monroe was extended beyond its holding by several lower federal
courts. It has been applied by analogy to immunize city agencies from
liability.3 It was interpreted, moreover, as prohibiting use of respon-
deat superior, even when the employer is a non-municipal entity or
public official, on the theory that only those who are personally in-
volved in the deprivation of an individual's civil rights are "persons"
within section 1983.32 This expansion was not universal, however, and
a number of courts held non-municipal public entities liable under
section 1983.33
MONROE UNDER FinE-ThE LOOPHOLES DEVELOP
Equitable Relief
The Seventh Circuit was the first lower court to test the boundaries
of the Monroe holding. In Adams v. City of Park Ridge34 the court
distinguished Monroe as having involved a claim for damages only.
The court concluded that equitable relief against the city was permis-
sible under section 1983. The reasons for denying damages against
a municipality, in the court's view, were not persuasive when applied
to prospective equitable liability that would not substantially impair the
public treasury. The distinction would appear valid and reasonable
except for a footnote in Monroe that seems to preclude equitable relief
as well as damages.35 In this footnote the Monroe Court noted:
In a few cases in which equitable relief has been sought, a munici-
pality has been named, along with city officials, as defendant where
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were alleged . . . . The question
30. See text accompanying notes 66-67 infra.
31. E.g., Davis v. United States, 439 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
Sellers v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 432 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 981 (1971); United States ex rel. Gittelmacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d
84 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970); Sams v. Board of Parole, 352
F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. E.g., Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Potts v. Wright, 357 F.
Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Barrows v. Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
33. Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1970) (by implication); Local
858, Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970). This position
is supported by cases in which the Supreme Court held non-municipal public entities
vicariously liable. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). See Verkuil, Immunity or Responsi-
bility for Unconstitutional Conduct: The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State,
50 N.C.L. REV. 548, 677-79 (1972).
34. 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
35. See Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th
Cir. 1967).
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dealt with in our opinion was not raised in those cases, either by
the parties or by the Court. Since we hold that a municipal cor-
poration is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, no infer-
ence to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases.30
The Adams court did not discuss this footnote in holding that
equitable relief was available although the court cited the cases men-
tioned in the footnote as authority for its decision.37  The Fifth Circuit
in Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School District8 discussed the
footnote and decided that it did not preclude equitable relief against
a miunicipalitya 9 The grant of equitable relief, moreover, seems to be
bolstered by Supreme Court decisions that allowed such relief under
section 1983 without mention of Monroe.
In Turner v. City of Memphis" the Supreme Court ordered is-
suance of an injunction against a municipality and a restaurant operator
under section 1983. The Court did not discuss the implications of the
footnote in Monroe although the alleged racially discriminatory prac-
tices by the restaurant occurred on property leased from the city. If
the footnote was intended to preclude equitable relief against a munici-
pality under section 1983, the result in Turner is not easily explained.41
Incorporation of State Law Through Section 1988
Most of the courts that have considered the question whether a
state law providing for municipal liability could be incorporated through
36. 365 U.S. at 191 n.50. Two cases in which equitable relief was granted against
municipalities under section 1983 were mentioned in the footnote. Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157 (1943).
37. 293 F.2d at 587.
38. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
39. We think the [Supreme Court in Monroe] was saying in the footnote that
the issue of damages against municipalities under respondeat superior was a
question not raised in the equitable relief cases cited and that no inference may
be drawn from those cases that a municipal corporation is a person within §
1983 for the purposes of a damage claim against it under respondeat superior.
We do not perceive that the court was expanding its holding by a footnote
dictum to eliminate municipalities as "persons" under § 1983 for the purposes
of equitable relief, a question not expressly considered in the cited equitable
relief cases.
Id. at 322. See also Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971);
Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Schnell v. City of Chicago,
407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Wolfe v. O'Neill, 336 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Alas. 1972).
40. 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam).
41. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Moor, cited Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1970) as authority for his argument that equitable relief was not foreclosed by
Monroe. In Mitchum the Court held that section 1983 was a specific exemption to
a federal statute barring injunctions against state court proceedings. Section 1983 was,
therefore, properly the basis of a suit to restrain unconstitutional state court actions.
The decision, however, appears to be less than persuasive as support for municipal lia-
bility under section 1983.
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section 1988 into a section 1983 cause of action have rejected it.42
In Carter v. Carlson,43 however, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held the District liable for violations of section 1983 by Dis-
trict police. The court pointed out that Monroe had involved an Illi-
nois municipality that had not waived its common-law immunity. The
District of Columbia, on the other hand, had no such immunity and
"the scope of immunity under section 1983 should follow the local
rule. ' 44  Since the local rule provided -for more effective implementa-
tion of the Civil Rights Act than the federal statutes, the court reasoned
that section 1988 should be available to incorporate that rule into the
section 1983 action.
Several other courts have considered the Carter rationale and have
rejected it. Some have distinguished it on the basis of congressional
control of the District of Columbia and on the ability of Congress to
provide for section 1983 liability for the District.45 The Seventh Cir-
cuit seems to have stated the basic objection to Carter, however, in
Yumich v. Cotter.46  "With all respect, however, we read Monroe as
a binding statutory construction, not dependent upon state law im-
munity, and not related to a deficiency in federal remedies, but estab-
lishing that section 1983 does not impose liability for damages upon a
city. '547
Section 1988 has been used to borrow remedial measures from
state law where the substantive sections of the Civil Rights Act were
inadequate to implement its policies. Most notable is Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park48 in which the Supreme Court incorporated the state law
of damages into a section 1982 claim. This type of incorporation ap-
pears to be the correct application of section 1988, i.e. where the cause
of action arises under the substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Act
and no adequate redress is available within the Act. Since municipal
liability cannot arise under section 1983 because of -the bar of Monroe,
a state law that waives municipal immunity cannot cure this jurisdic-
tional defect. 49
42. E.g., Gonzales v. Doe, 476 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). The Supreme Court did not reach the issue
of section 1988 incorporation; holding that the District of Columbia was not a "State
or Territory" within section 1983.
44. Id. at 369.
45. E.g., Ries v. Lynskey, 452 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1971).
46. 452 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 61.
48. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
49. While § 1988 may allow use of state remedies in redressing deprivations
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Pendent Jurisdiction
Where none of the foregoing methods of obtaining jurisdiction
over a municipal defendant are available, a federal court might still
retain jurisdiction over the state law claim under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Since providing a federal forum, to litigants who could
get no relief from the state courts, even where state law ostensibly pro-
vided such relief, was one of the primary objectives of Congress in en-
acting the Civil Rights Act,50 the avenue of pendent jurisdiction, if
open under the circumstances, is valuable in fulfilling this objective.
There is some dispute, however, over whether a federal court has the
power to join a party, not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, in a fed-
eral action against different parties properly before the court.5 '
The Supreme Court established the accepted test for the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.5 2  The test
involves two issues: (1) does the court have the constitutional power
to hear the state claim, and (2) in the court's discretion, will the poli-
cies of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants"5'
be promoted by hearing both claims in one trial? The court has the
power to hear the state claim if:
[T]he relationship between the [federal] claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court com-
prises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have
under § 1983, at least where federal remedies are deficient, . . .we are here
confronted with the preliminary issue of whether liability exists at all under§ 1983, not what remedy would be appropriate if liability should exist. Mani-
festly the nature of an appropriate remedy, which assumes the existence of lia-
bility, is irrelevant to the question of whether liability can attach in the first
place.
Gonzalez v. Doe, 476 F.2d 680, 685 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. See, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961); Kates & Kouba, supra note
26, at 145-46.
51. Compare Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969), and Wojtas v. Village
of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), and Drennan v. City of Lake Forest, 356 F.
Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1972), with Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800 (2d Cir. 1971), and Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), and Eidschun
v. Pierce, 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971); cf. Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dun-
lap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971).
52. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). This decision changed the earlier test of Hum v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). The Hum prerequisite for the exercise of pendent juris-
diction was that the federal and state claims be merely different grounds for the same
cause of action. If the federal claim constituted a different cause of action, there could
be no pendent jurisdiction; id. at 246. Gibbs called this approach "unnecessarily grudg-
ing", and therefore the Court liberalized the criteria for pendent jurisdiction. 383 U.S.
at 725. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 657
(1968); Note, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REV., supra note 26, at 216-28.
53. 383 U.S. at 726.
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substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court. The state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to
their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial pro-
ceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there
is power in federal courts to hear the whole.54
If the court has the power under this test, it must then decide whether
to exercise its discretion to grant or deny pendent jurisdiction. "Its
justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to the litigants; if these are not present a federal court should
hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims. . .."55
The Gibbs decision did not consider the troublesome problem of
"pendent parties," i.e. where pendent jurisdiction is used to bring into
federal court a party not independently subject to a federal claim by
joining a state claim against him to federal claims against other par-
ties.'l8 The lower federal courts have divided on the question of the
power to hear such claims under the Gibbs test,5 7 and some have
avoided the issue by declining to grant pendent jurisdiction as a matter
of discretion."
The pendent party question in the context of section 1983 and
municipal liability was considered by a federal district court in Tauss
v. Rizzo." Plaintiffs attempted to enter Frank Rizzo's mayoralty
campaign headquarters to protest his policies as Police Commissioner
of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs were brutally beaten by police officers
guarding the headquarters and arrested on numerous charges. Sub-
sequently aquitted of all charges, plaintiffs brought action against Rizzo
and the assaulting policemen under section 1983. They joined the City
of Philadelphia in an amended complaint. The court held that the city
was not a "person" within section 1983. But the court then asserted
pendent jurisdiction over the municipality. The court pointed out that
54. Id. at 725.
55. Id. at 726.
56. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 26, at 161-67; Note, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REV.,
supra note 26, at 216-28. See also Note, 81 HAnv. L. REv., supra note 52.
57. Compare, e.g., Eidschun v. Pierce, 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971), with
Barrows v. Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
58. E.g., Gonzalez v. Doe, 476 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1973); Patrum v. City of Greens-
burg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
59. 361 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This case was decided after the Supreme
Court handed down Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). See Smith v.
Spina, 477 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1973); cf. Salinas v. Flores, 359 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Tex.
1973); Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347 (D. Hawaii 1973); Schwab v. First Appalachian
Ins. Co., 58 F.R.D. 615 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
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"[t]he now *permissible claim against the City is based upon the simple
application of the principle of respondeat superior which would pre-
sent no difficulty to a fact finder. The factors of judicial economy and
the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits dictate that these claims should
be tried in a single lawsuit." 60
MOOR AND KENOSHA-WHAT WEIGHT TO GIVE MONROE?
The Court in Monroe regarded the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act as conclusively establishing the proposition that municipali-
ties were not to be held liable for violations by their employees. Since
Congress had not provided for such liability and the Court could not
expand the statute without congressional approval, it considered policy
factors irrelevant.6 ' In the Court's two recent decisions on the issue,
Monroe was reaffirmed without question, and policy was again dis-
missed as irrelevant to the inquiry. 62
The desirability of municipal liability under section 1983 cannot
be questioned. 63  The arguments are generally the same as those
against common-law sovereign immunity, and a justification for such
immunity is difficult to formulate. 64  However, given the Monroe de-
cision, these policies, indeed, become irrelevant to a subsequent court
proceeding, and the arguments for change must be made to Congress."
This does not mean the Court was necessarily justified in extending the
60. 361 F. Supp. at 1199.
61. It is said that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal liability
because private remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures are
conspicuously ineffective, and because municipal liability will not only afford
plaintiffs responsible defendants but cause those defendants to eradicate abuses
that exist at the police level. We do not reach those policy considerations.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
62. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973).
63. "Governmental liability is important not only to provide financially responsible
defendants, but primarily so that the deterrent will be effective where it is needed-
at the level where police policy is made." Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations
of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 514 (1955). See also UNITED STATES
COMm'N ON CIVIL RiGHTs, 1961 COMM'N ON CIVrI RIGHTs REPORT: JUSTICE, Book V,
at 111, 113.
64. The usual justifications are presented in Kates v. Kouba, supra note 26, at 142-
44. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 449 (1961); Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A
Comparative Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New
York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REv. 39 (1969).
65. Since the Monroe holding has been reaffirmed and extended in Moor and Ken-
osha, the Court appears unwilling to change that interpretation of section 1983. Legis-
lative change was suggested soon after Monroe in UNITD STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 113.
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Monroe holding without considering the purposes behind enactment of
the Civil Rights Act.
The Civil Rights Act was enacted pursuant to the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment for the purpose of providing a fed-
eral forum to persons deprived of their rights under the newly enacted
amendment. The federal courts were necessary to enforcement because
state courts were suspected of not enforcing the rights of Negroes and
of allowing civil rights violators to go unpunished either criminally or
civilly.66 The provisions for federal jurisdiction were not made de-
pendent upon the presence or absence of an adequate state law rem-
edy but were meant to provide a federal forum despite state laws.6 7
In Moor the Court assumed the correctness of the Monroe holding
that Congress had not made municipalities answerable in damages for
the acts of employees that violated section 1983. The Court then held
that section 1988 could not be used as a means of obtaining federal
jurisdiction over a municipality.6" This holding was the result, how-
ever, of the Court's reading of section 1988 and was not based merely
upon the force of Monroe.69 The construction given section 1988
seems consistent with its apparent purpose in the civil rights scheme 70
to provide suitable remedies for violations of the substantive provi-
sions of the Act. Of course, the Court's assumption was implicit that
municipalities could not violate these substantive provisions under Mon-
roe.71  The purpose of the Act in providing a federal forum should
66. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
67. "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief."
Id. at 183.
68. See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
69. The Court briefly reviewed the legislative history of secton 1983 in rejecting
the argument that where state law provided for vicarious municipal liability, section 1983
should not prohibit such liability. 411 U.S. at 707-10.
70. The Court looked to the legislative origins of section 1988 in order to discover
its intended scope. The Court concluded that:
Considered in context, this latter portion of § 3 [of the original 1866 Civil
Rights Act], which has become § 1988 and has been made applicable to the
Civil Rights Acts generally, was obviously intended to do nothing more than
to explain the source of law to be applied in actions brought to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Act including § 1 [now § 1982]. To hold other-
wise would tear § 1988 loose from its roots in § 3 of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act. This we will not do.
Id. at 705-06.
71. The petitioners did not attack Monroe but sought to circumvent it by arguing
that since a municipality could not be held liable under section 1983 as interpreted in
Monroe, the federal law was inadequate to redress civil rights violations against judg-
ment proof individual defendants. Therefore, petitioners contended, section 1988 makes
state law available to federal courts, and the County should be made liable under section
1983 as supplemented by the state law of vicarious liability for municipalities. Monroe
1974] 1299
1300 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
not be implemented at the cost of a tortured interpretation of one of its
provisions. Since section 1988 was interpreted reasonably,"2 only by
overnuling Monroe could the Court have allowed federal jurisdiction,
and then only through section 1983 and not section 1988.
The decision in City of Kenosha v. Bruno,73 however, rested en-
tirely on Monroe. The latter contains strong support for the proposi-
tion that "the generic word 'person' in § 1983 was [not] intended to
have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on
the nature of relief sought against them. '7 4  However, that conclusion
is not compelled by the facts of Monroe, and the Court could have
distinguished Kenosha on that basis and promoted the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act without overruling Monroe.7 C
Since Monroe was based on Congress' rejection of the Sherman
Amendment, which provided for damages against a municipality, the
Court in Kenosha could easily have held that a bifurcated approach
allowing equitable relief was consistent with Monroe and its interpre-
tation of the legislative history. Such a holding would allow federal
courts to issue injunctions against municipalities and thereby correct
governed, therefore, only to the extent of defining the substantive limits of section 1983;
the Court in Moor conducted an independent investigation of the legislative history of
section 1988 and concluded that this section was intended to incorporate state law in
order to supply remedies. However, since a claim against the County could not arise
under section 1983, there could be no substantive liability on which to append a state
law remedy, and section 1988 was not intended to create substantive liability through
state law incorporation. But see Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 55 Mmi,. L. REv. 1201 (1971).
72. The Court distinguished cases in which state laws of vicarious liability were in-
corporated into section 1983 through section 1988 where the person held vicariously li-
able was an individual superior public official, who was subject to the substantive pro-
visions of section 1983, rather than a municipality that could not be substantively liable.
411 U.S. at 704 n.17.
At least one lower court has voiced concern over this distinction.
The court remains concerned about a possible anomoly in these Civil
Rights laws. [Monroe] could be evaded by joining the directors of a state
agency and not the agency itself if the relevant state law, applicable through
§ 1988, included vicarious liability for governmental employees. . . . In con-
trast, a state agency cannot be vicariously liable under the Civil Rights laws
regardless of possible state law of respondeat superior. [Moor]. Thus individ-
uals and not a state government, may have to bear the financial burden of
a civil rights judgment in a case in which they are not charged with having
committed any specific acts against the plaintiffs.
Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1275 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
73. 412 U.S. 507 (1973); see text accompanying note 22 supra.
74. 412 U.S. at 513.
75. The plaintiffs in Monroe sought only damages whereas in Kenosha plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Had the Court undertaken an independent in-
vestigation of the legislative history of section 1983, the Court could undoubtedly have
held that equitable relief would not be inconsistent with congressional disapproval of
damages. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 26, at 147-48.
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
abuses by applying pressure on local policy making officials to deter
their employees from violations of the Civil Rights Act. 6 Moreover,
the holding that equitable relief is not available in Kenosha is difficult
to reconcile with decisions of the Court, subsequent to Monroe, that
allowed such relief in somewhat analogous circumstances. 77
If injunctions were issued against municipalities under section
1983, this alone would not completely overcome the general objections
to municipal immunity,78 but such relief would go far in supporting
the purposes of the Civil Rights Act.79 A federal forum would be
provided to protect federal civil rights against municipalities acting or
condoning action by their servants in disregard of those rights. Such
relief seems to be the essence of the Civil Rights Act. Yet Kenosha
blindly follows Monroe and, without discussing these policies, cuts off
the possibility of equitable relief.
CONCLUSION
Pendent jurisdiction appears to be the only "loophole" remaining
after Moor and Kenosha that provides a federal forum for actions un-
der section 1983 against municipalities. Although Moor upheld a
denial of pendent jurisdiction on discretionary grounds, it refused to
decide the question of the power of the federal courts to hear "pendent
party" claims.8 0 Until that question is resolved by the Supreme Court,
the lower courts are likely to continue reaching divergent results in
joining municipal defendants to federal section 1983 claims against in-
dividuals.
The logical approach for the Supreme Court to take on the ques-
tion would be to deny the power to join parties through the judicially
developed doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. However desirable this
76. See note 63 supra.
77. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
78. Even if injunctions could secure freedom from deprivation of constitu-
tional rights for the plaintiff, their non-compensatory nature renders them an
incomplete remedy. Not only are private attorneys less likely to take the case,
but the injured parties, knowing the costs of litigation and the lack of monetary
award, will often choose to endure the abuse. This reduces the likelihood of
reform and increases the boldness of the offending agency.
Kates & Kouba, supra note 26, at 151.
79. Some commentators have suggested that if equitable relief were available in
civil rights actions against municipalities, it would be possible to get a damage claim,
based on state law, into federal court through pendent jurisdiction. Kates, supra note
26, at 201.
80. 411 U.S. at 413-15. The Court noted the analogy of pendent parties to
"joinder of new parties under the well established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in
the context of compulsory counterclaims under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a) and 13(b)
and in the context of third-party claims under ... 14(a)." Id, at 414-15.
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method of joinder, it would be somewhat inconsistent, after the Court
has determined that Congress intended to deny a federal claim against
a party, then to grant federal jurisdiction by merely joining the party to
a closely connected claim against a party properly before the federal
court.81
Since the Court has refused to limit or overrule Monroe, it seems
logical to expect that it will not allow that decision to be circumvented
through pendent party jurisdiction. However, the Court could allow
such joinder of a municipality to a federal section 1983 claim on the
theory that such joinder does no violence to the Monroe holding since
the municipality would not be held liable under section 1983, a possi-
bility foreclosed by Moor and Kenosha, but only under applicable state
law. Pendent party jurisdiction would serve merely as a convenient
method of trying the state claim together with a federal claim arising
out of the same facts in a single proceeding in federal court.
Until the Court finally resolves the question, the availability of
pendent party jurisdiction will continue in some federal courts. The
doctrine satisfies the purposes of the Civil Rights Act by providing a
federal forum to hear claims against municipalities in section 1983 ac-
tions. However, pendent jurisdiction is not a panacea, for it depends
absolutely on the state law governing sovereign immunity and respond-
eat superior.82 Furthermore, the ease with which some courts deny
pendent jurisdiction in their discretion and the reluctance to find abuses
of that discretion tends to reduce the effectiveness of this method of
getting municipalities into federal court for section 1983 violations.
The holding of the Court in Monroe was virtually the death blow
to section 1983 actions against municipal corporations, and the loop-
holes that developed were destined to be short-lived in the absence of a
reconsideration of that decision.83 The closing of these loopholes in
Moor and Kenosha forces a difficult decision upon section 1983 liti-
gants; forego the federal forum and join the municipality in a state ac-
tion, or sue only individuals in federal court and, if pendent jurisdic-
tion is denied, forego the benefits of a municipal defendant.
WILLIAM R. SAGE
81. See Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
82. See Salinas v. Flores, 359 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
83. Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, dissented in both Moor and Keno-
sha arguing that the loopholes should remain open. He added to his opinion in Kenosha
an appendix that developed the legislative history of section 1983 beyond that considered
in Monroe, 412 U.S, 'at 517-20,
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Labor Law-Bargaining Orders Without Election Interference
In recent years the courts1 and the National Labor Relations
Board' have struggled to establish standards for the issuance of bar-
gaining orders3 in situations in which unions seek recognition on the
basis of authorization card4 majorities. In Truck Drivers Local 413 v.
NLRB5 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed this
type of recognition demand and granted a bargaining order in response
to the employer's refusal to bargain although there had been no inter-
ference with the representation-election scheme of the Act.' As a re-
sult, -a union's ability to achieve recognition has been significantly en-
hanced.
The facts of the two cases consolidated in this opinion are very
similar. In Wilder Mfg. Co.' the union demanded recognition based
upon authorization cards from a majority of the employees.8 The em-
ployer, however, refused this demand, contending that the union did
not possess a true majority of the authorization cards. The employees
who had signed authorization cards then established a picket line and
later filed a charge alleging a violation of section 8(a)(5)9 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.10  The trial examiner found that the em-
1. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. General
Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co., 417 F.2d 192
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Schuckman Press, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 158 (1970); Davis Wholesale
Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 1 (1970); J.P. Stevens & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969). See also,
e.g., Doppelt & Ladd, Gissel Packing Company-The NLRB Applies the Standards, 49
CQn.-KENT L. REv. 161 (1972); Gordon, Union Authorization Cards and the Duty to
Bargain, 19 LAB. LJ. 201 (1968); Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of
a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. Rrv. 349 (1969).
3. A bargaining order is a directive from the National Labor Relations Board or-
dering an employer to bargain with a union; see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575 (1969). A union can also gain recognition by the employer granting voluntary
recognition; see Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961); or
by a union victory in a Board election; see 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
4. See Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 807-20 (1969) (ex-
planation of the authorization card procedure).
5. 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6. Id. at 1113.
7. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
8. Eleven of the eighteen employees in the unit had signed authorization cards.
487 F.2d at 1101.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this title."
10. Id. §§ 151-68.
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ployer's conduct violated section 8(a)(5),11 but the Board, after two
previous considerations of the case,12 held that there could be no viola-
tion of section 8(a)(5) absent independent unfair labor practices"a
unless an employer had voluntarily agreed to determine majority status
of the union by a method other than Board election.' 4
In the companion case, Linden Lumber Division,"C the union de-
mand based on authorization cards was refused by the employer on the
theory that since the union had been organized by supervisors, recogni-
tion would result in a violation of section 8(a)(2).11 The union then
withdrew a previously filed representation petition, began a recognition
strike, and filed a section 8 (a) (5) charge. The trial examiner again
found that section 8(a) (5) had been violated, 7 but the Board, re-
jecting the expanded version of the independent knowledge test,18 did
not find a refusal to bargain on these facts. The Board thus held that
section 8(a)(5) applied in this situation only if the employer has vol-
untarily agreed to determine majority status by a means other than an
election. 19
The unions in both cases appealed, contending that the independ-
ent knowledge test was applicable and that the employer has a duty to
recognize the union when there is "convincing evidence" of majority
status. They argued that the recognition strikes provided the neces-
11. See 487 F.2d at 1101. The trial examiner also dismissed a charge based on
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970), but this issue was not before the court on appeal. 487
F.2d at 1101 n.6.
12. In Wilder Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 214 (1968), the Board dismissed the section
8(a) (5) charge since the employer had neither rejected the collective bargaining princi-
ple nor interfered with the election process. The court of appeals remanded this deci-
sion for reconsideration in light of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969);
see Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
The Board in Wilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 175 (1970), found a violation of section
8(a) (5) due to the employer's independent knowledge of the majority status of the union
and his unwillingness to resolve any doubts by a Board election. Following the Board's
decision in Linden Lumber Div., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), the Board's petition to re-
consider the first Wilder decision was granted; see 487 F.2d at 1103. The Board then
issued the decision which was appealed to the court of appeals in Truck Drivers.
13. Independent unfair labor practices refer to those other than violations of sec-
tion 8(a)(5) which are found in 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(4) (1970).
14. 198 N.L.R.B. at--, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
15. 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970).
17. The trial examiner also found a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970),
but the Board determined the violation was not serious enough to require a bargaining
order; 190 N.L.R.B. at 719. This finding was not challenged on appeal. 487 F.2d at
1105.
18. See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
19. 190 N.L.R.B. at 721.
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sary evidence to satisfy the independent knowledge standard. 21
To resolve these conflicting views, the court of appeals first looked
to section 9(a)21 which provides that the collective bargaining repre-
sentative be "designated or selected." Although this provision has
been interpreted to permit majority status to be determined by a means
other than an election,22 the court pointed out that elections are pre-
ferred by the Supreme Court and the Board.23 The court then stated
that section 9(c)(1)(B) 24 enables management to resolve any doubts
about a union's majority status by petitioning for an election, but it
does not provide an absolute right to an election.25  After tracing the
development of prior tests26 for issuing bargaining orders, the court
formulated a new standard which requires the employer either to recog-
nize the union or to petition for an election under section 9(o)(1)
(B).2 7  Since the employers in Truck Drivers had not used -the section
9(c)(1)(B) procedure, the court remanded with directions that a bar-
gaining order be issued.28
To analyze this decision properly, it is first necessary to consider
the prior standards used by the courts and the Board. The good faith-
20. 487 F.2d at 1106-07.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides: "Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... "
22. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
23. 487 F.2d at 1107.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970) provides:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regu-
lations as may be prescribed by the Board-
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organi-
zations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the rapresenta-
tive defined in subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide
for an appropriate hearing upon due notice.
25. 487 F.2d at 1110.
26. See text accompanying notes 29-39 infra.
27. 487 F.2d at 1113.
28. The court of appeals also rejected the union contention; see text accompanying
note 20 supra. The court of appeals quoted from Gissel, stating that the employer does
have a duty to recognize a union if "convincing evidence" of its majority support is
shown. 487 F.2d at 1106. The court examined the evidence which the union contended
was "convincing evidence" of majority support such as the recognition strike by a major-
ity of the employees and the statement by the management that ten or eleven employees
supported the union. It held that this evidence need not be treated as "convincing evi-
dence" by the Board. Id. at 1109.
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doubt test, adopted in Joy Silk Mills, Inc.,20 provided that an employer
could refuse to recognize a union if he had a good faith doubt about
the union's majority status. The Board could issue a bargaining order
only if the employer could not prove he had a good faith doubt or if
the employer's unfair labor practices could be used as evidence of his
bad faith. 0 This rule was modified in Aaron Brothers Co. 1 so that
the burden was placed upon the General Counsel of the Board to show
the employer's bad faith. However, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 2
the Supreme Court stated that the Board had abandoned the good faith-
doubt test.33
The Board has also applied an independent knowledge test to de-
termine when a bargaining order is appropriate. According to this
doctrine, a bargaining order could be issued if the employer had know-
ledge, independent of the authorization cards, that a majority of the
employees supported the union. This test originated in Snow & Sons"4
where a bargaining order was entered because an employer dishonored
an agreement to recognize a union after the authorization cards had
been authenticated by a third party pursuant to an agreement.3 5 This
standard was expanded in Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.36 where a bar-
gaining order was issued although there had been no authentication
agreement. In that case independent knowledge was inferred because
the employer had verified the cards, had talked with employees who
favored the union and had observed a recognition strike by a majority
of the employees.37 In Truck Drivers the Board reinstated the more
restricted version of the independent knowledge standard as expressed
in Snow & Sons.3"
The Supreme Court in Gissel laid down a third standard for the
29. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
30. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1969). See also
Pegrebin, NLRB Bargaining Orders Since Gissel: Wandering From a Landmark, 46
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 193, 194-97 (1971).
31. 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
32. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
33. Id. at 594. During oral argument in Gissel, the Board announced it had aban-
doned the good faith-doubt test. Id.
34. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
35. See 487 F.2d at 1107-08; Comment, Employer Recognition of Unions on the
Basis of Authorization Cards: The "Independent Knowledge" Standard, 39 U. Cm. L.
REV. 314, 319-20 (1972); 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 731, 737.
36. 182 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
37. See 487 F.2d at 1108; Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 35, at 320-
21; 1971 U. ILL. L.F., supra note 35, at 741.
38. 487 F.2d at 1108. See text accompanying notes 14 & 19 supra.
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issuance of bargaining orders. The Court held that a bargaining order
could be entered if the employer had destroyed the possibility of a fair
election by his unfair labor practices. 39  The Court, however, did not
specify what action should be taken absent election interference by
management, 40 and accordingly Gissel did not control the court of ap-
peals' decision in the present case.
The court of appeals could have decided the case on existing
precedents. Since there was no conclusive support for the contention
that a recognition strike constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
bargaining order,41 -the court was not compelled to adopt the union
position. The independent knowledge test,42 on the other hand, was
clearly a viable option since it had been applied in similar situations in
the past and had been reaffirmed by the Board in Wilder and Linden
Lumber. Nevertheless, the court chose to ignore the Board standard
and instead created its own test.
The decision by the court of appeals is not without merit. It pro-
vides certainty and ease of application since the only inquiry is whether
the employer did or did not petition for an election. As a result em-
ployers will be encouraged to use the 9(c)(1)(B) procedure to resolve
doubts about the majority status of a union demanding recognition on
the basis of authorization cards. Furthermore, the court's standard,
which is very similar to the union proposal in Gissel,4" will eliminate
tactics which were in the past used by employers to delay recognition.
In union petitioned elections the employer has often challenged the elec-
tion on the basis of the inappropriateness of the suggested unit. This
tactic resulted in a hearing conducted by the regional director of the
NLRB at which the employer could delay the election.44 However,
if the employer petitioned for the election, he could not request a hear-
39. 395 U.S. at 579. See Carson, The Gissel Doctrine: When a Bargaining Order
Will Issue, 41 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 85 (1972).
40. 395 U.S. at 595, 614; Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good
Faith Doubt": The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 411, 423 (1970); 1972-73 Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. Rav. 1173, 1192 (1973); 1971 U. ILL. L.F., supra note 35, at 741.
41. See note 28 supra; text accompanying note 20 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
43. The union in Gissel contended that when an employer is faced with a recogni-
tion demand based upon cards, he must recognize the union or petition for an election.
395 U.S. at 594-95.
44. Even under the court's standard, the employer could wait a long time before
filing his petition or could continuously propose frivolous units, but the Board could is-
sue a bargaining order due to such abuse of the election process or set definite time
limits for the petition to be properly submitted. See generally Excelsior Underwear,
Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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ing since he must propose the appropriate unit."5 Faced with the em-
ployer petition, the union would perhaps waive any objections it might
have in order to avoid -the delay which a hearing would necessitate
since enthusiasm, and perhaps the election, could be lost due to the
ensuing postponement. 4" Accordingly, the result is an expedited elec-
tion process 47 which will separate those employers with real doubts from
those merely attempting to deny recognition to the union."
Nevertheless, the court of appeals' interpretation of section 9(c)
(1)(B) does not seem to comport with the literal wording of that pro-
vision.49 The language allows the employer to petition for an election,
but it does not require that he do so. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
in Gissel pointed out that section 9(c) (1) (B) was intended "to allow
them [the management], after being asked to bargain, to test out their
doubts as to a union's majority. . . ."50 The use of the word "allow"
is indicative of a permissive rather than a mandatory interpretation of
the section's purpose, and therefore the court of appeals' position ap-
pears unwarranted.
Since there is no direct precedent in support of the court's de-
cision, certain matters of policy must be considered in order to under-
stand the reasoning of the court and the Board. First of all, protection
of the employee's free choice in deciding upon a bargaining repre-
sentation is one of the primary purposes of the NRLA.91 Uncoerced
and unrestrained choice is especially important since a recognized union
acts as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit.62 To
achieve this purpose the Board seeks to maintain the "laboratory con-
ditions'"5 of the election process by utilizing the comprehensive set of
45. See Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. Rav., supra note 35, at 325-27. Of course if
the employer's unit proposal was outrageous, the regional director could suggest a change
without the necessity of a hearing, or the union could simply disclaim any interest in
that unit. The union could of course contest the unit and ask for a hearing which would
be a short proceeding since the union would limit the number of its objections. Id.
at 327.
46. Id. at 326-27.
47. There is a significant difference in the time required for a consent election
and one in which the election is contested. In a contested election an average of forty-
three days is required from the time the petition is filed until the regional director's
decision is made. In a consent election, the hearing is waived so that only three to
five days elapse between the petition filing and the agreement for the election. Thus
forty days are saved. Id. at 325 n.48.
48. Id. at 328.
49. See note 24 supra.
50. 395 U.S. at 599 (emphasis added).
51. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1970).
52. See id. § 159(a).
53. The Board seeks to provide conditions similar to those in a laboratory in order
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laws contained in the NLRA.11 Free choice by employees in deciding
whether they wish union representation should be an informed choice
after having heard the views of both the union and the employer. Or-
dinarily, however, an employee signs an authorization card without be-
ing exposed to the employer's position, and yet he is fully aware of the
union viewpoint as a result of organizational meetings, hand bill dis-
tributions, and other organizational activities.55 Thus the employee's
choice is made on the basis of information -from the union side only.
In addition to this one-sided exposure is the possibility of coercion,
forgery, and misrepresentation by the union.5 6 Therefore to enable the
employee to decide freely whether the union is desired, an election
should be held rather than the issuance of a bargaining order on the
basis of an authorization card majority 5 7
The preference for a Board election, rather than a card-based
bargaining order, when there has been no election interference was
pointed out by the Supreme Court in Gissel.55 The Supreme Court
also stated that elections help bring about industrial stability 0 because
a valid election, regardless of the outcome, prevents for a twelve month
period election petitions by rival unions or decertification by vote of the
employees.60 Congress has also demonstrated that the election process
is favored by amending the National Labor Relations Act in 1959 to
make it an unfair labor practice if an uncertified union engages in
recognition picketing unless an election petition is filed within a rea-
sonable period.6' Furthermore, the election process, even if initiated
by a union petition and contested by the employer, is a fairly quick
process and would certainly be more rapid than the legal proceedings
necessary to obtain a bargaining order.62
to determine the true desires of the employees. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124,
127 (1948); see Note, 75 YALE LU., supra note 4, at 823.
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§157-59 (1970).
55. See L. JACKSON & R. LEWIS, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS 37 (1972); Lewis,
Gissel Packing: Was the Supreme Court Right?, 56 A.B.A.J. 877 (1970).
56. See Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 35, at 318.
57. Of course, an election can also be tainted by coercion. Lesnick, Establishment
of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 851, 866-67 (1967).
58. 395 U.S. at 601 n.18.
59. Id. at 599 n.14.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
61. Id. § 158(b) (7) (C). This provision has been held to be applicable to a ma-
jority union. International Hod Carriers Local 480, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
62. The Wilder case illustrates the inordinate length of time which may be required
when a bargaining order is sought. In Wilder the underlying facts and the complaint
charging the employer with a section 8(a) (5) violation took place in 1965-1966; 487
F.2d 1100-01. The dispute is not yet finally resolved. An election could have been
held in a much shorter period; see note 47 supra.
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Although the court purported to place emphasis on the preferred
election process, the result in Truck Drivers was a bargaining order
based on the unregulated solicitation of authorization cards.03  The
Board approach, on the other hand, actually favors the election process
because a bargaining order would not be as easily granted as under the
court standard. In fact, in situations similar to that of Truck Drivers,
the union would be free to petition for an election even if the employ-
er's actions rise to the level of a refusal to bargain. If the union wins
the election, it will be certified as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive."' If the union loses the election and the employer committed un-
fair labor practices which interfere with that election, the union will be
entitled to. a bargaining order."5 If the union loses the election with-
out unlawful interference by the employer, the union has been given a
fair chance to demonstrate its majority support by the more reliable
election process.
If it does become necessary to issue a bargaining order, the test
for its issuance should be designed to insure that the union actually rep-
resents a majority of the employees. Under the Board approach there
would be such evidence since according to the agreement between the
employer and the union, a third party would verify the card majority.0
Therefore, the Board could be confident that the union, which would
receive the benefit of the bargaining order upon breach of the agree-
ment by the employer, did enjoy the majority support of the employees.
Even if the standard used to grant a bargaining order was a showing
of "convincing evidence"0' 7 such as a recognition strike by a majority
of the employees, there would be some evidence of the union's majority
status. However, under the court's approach a bargaining order could
be issued merely upon a union demand for recognition based upon au-
thorization cards if the employer did not recognize the union or petition
for an election. Thus there would be no assurance, other than the un-
ion's alleged possession of authorization cards, that the majority of the
employees really wanted the union as their representative. Even if
majority status were required to be shown, it must be further decided
when to measure the purported union majority-at ,the time of the union
demand or at the time of the section 8(a)(5) proceeding-since the
63. See Note, 75 YALE L., supra note 4, at 823-28.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
65. See 395 U.S. at 579, 599-600.
66. 487 F.2d at 1107-08.
67. See note 28 supra; text accompanying note 20 supra.
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degree of employee support may well vary.68
The previous discussion has emphasized the protection of em-
ployee interests, but one must also consider the employer's interests
since the purpose of the NLRA is to protect management as well as
labor. 9 It is at least arguable that the right of the employer to present
his views to his employees is protected by -the first amendment r ° and
by section 8(c) 71 of the NLRA. However, the standard of the court
of appeals, which expands the instances in which a bargaining order is
permissible, inhibits the exercise of the employer's rights. Whenever
the employer is faced with authorization cards, he has difficulty in
presenting his own views to the employees because he often finds out
about the card campaign after it is well underway. 72 Furthermore,
a card campaign is more difficult to counter than an election since the
effort must be directed at individuals rather than groups of employees,
the union proposals are not clearly made known to the employer and
the campaign has no fixed time limit."
The court's test could also lead to increased harassment of em-
ployers by unions seeking recognition and a corresponding increase in
defensive employer petitions for elections in order to protect themselves
from bargaining orders. Conversely, the employer will be under
pressure to recognize a union on -the basis of a card demand because
the alternatives are not particularly attractive. The employer could
petition for an election, but he would not have the usual advantages of
a union petitioned election. Specifically, he could not obtain a pre-
election hearing at which to contest the proposed election, and the
election would take place more quickly.74 Alternatively, the employer
could refuse to bargain with the union, but that would bring about a
section 8(a)(5) proceeding and possibly an eventual bargaining or-
68. Employees may sign cards before they understand the employer's point of view,
and then change their minds after the employer's campaign is begun. Of course it is
possible for employees who have earlier refused to sign cards to decide later to support
the union.
69. The NLRA states that the employers, employees and unions should recognize
"one another's legitimate rights." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
70. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See 2 J. JENKINs, LABOR LAW § 5.3, at 12 (1969).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970). See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co.,
355 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1966); Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.
1962); Note, 75 YALE L.J., supra note 4, at 831. However the employer's right to free
speech is not without limit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Central Power & Light Co., 425 F.2d
1318 (5th Cir. 1970); Martin Sprocket & Gear Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1964); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
72. See Note, 75 YALE L.J, supra note 4, at 831.
73. Id. at 832-34.
74. See note 46 supra; text accompanying note 45 supra.
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der. Faced with these options, the employer may well choose to rec-
ognize the union voluntarily, but even so he must take reasonable pre-
cautions to insure that the union has majority support to avoid viola-
tion of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2). 75
Nevertheless, one could argue that the court's test actually in-
creases the employer's rights because it gives him an opportunity to
petition for an election even if he has independent knowledge of the
union's majority support .7  Although the court of appeals declined to
rule on this issue,77 undoubtedly it will have to be decided in the fu-
ture if the court's standard prevails. If the courts determine that the
employer can use section 9(c)(1)(B) even if he has independent
knowledge of the majority status, the union will not be entitled to a
bargaining order even if the employer breaches an agreement to rec-
ognize the union on the basis of authenticated authorization cards. If
it is held otherwise, the Board and courts will once again be required
to make an inquiry into the employer's state of mind, a task which has
proven to be extremely difficult in the past.7  Of course, this issue
would never have to be faced if the Board test were applied.
The Board test establishes three possible avenues leading to union
recognition: (1) a union petitioned election; (2) recognition pursu-
ant to an agreement between the parties providing for outside verifica-
tion of authorization cards; and (3) a bargaining order as a remedy
for breach of the agreement or for election interference. This plan
seems clearly preferable to the court's approach which, in spite of its
positive features, 79 has many inherent defects. Apparently, none of the
parties"0 were pleased with the court's plan since all parties petitioned
for certiorari.8 ' Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,
8 2 it
75. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961). See also Shea Chemical Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958).
76. See Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. RiEv., supra note 35, at 328.
77. 487 F.2d at 1111.
78. See Pogrebin, supra note 30, at 194.
79. See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra. The court assumes it aids the em-
ployees by protecting them, but this is no longer the case. In the early years of union
organization and growth in the United States, the unions did need the court's help in
preserving the rights of employees when dealing with the more powerful employers.
However, today the union movement is strong and the courts also should be concerned
about protecting the employees from the unions. See Rains, Authorization Cards as an
Indefensible Basis for Board Directed Union Representation Status: Fact and Fancy,
18 LAB. L.J. 226, 235 (1967).
80. It may seem strange that the union is not satisfied with this decision. How-
ever, it should be remembered that in its decision, the court did not adopt the union
view. See note 28 supra; text accompanying note 20 supra.
81. 42 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974).
82. Id. at 3594 (U.S. April 23, 1974).
Eval 521312
1974] BARGAINING ORDERS 1313
should reverse the holding of the court of appeals and order a determina-
tion consistent with the present Board view which more effectively carries
out the intent of the statute and more fairly protects the rights of em-
ployees and employers.8 3
WILLIAM ANDREW PARKER
83. The court of appeals decision is very important since section 10(f) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), grants this court jurisdiction over a dispute in which
any party is aggrieved by a final order of the Board. Therefore any union involved
in such a dispute could appeal the case to this court and receive a bargaining order
on similar facts.

